

The City of God as Pariah: Peregrinic Metaphysics as a Ground for Ethics in Augustine's *De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos*

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I

In the waning years of World War II when Jewish refugees were struggling to find their place in a world that had cast them out, Hannah Arendt¹ wrote two articles, "We Refugees" and "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition," in which she examined the identity crisis that Jewish refugees faced at the crossroads of emancipation and assimilation. She analyzed two historical traditions of Jewish identity that emerged during this crisis: one common, and the other more rare and hidden. The more common tradition was that of the *parvenu*, the refugee who assimilated to the new culture and was able to say, in the words of one of Arendt's fellow refugees, "We have been good Germans in Germany and therefore we shall be good Frenchmen in France."² The more hidden tradition was that of the *pariah*, the one who, conscious of being a political, legal, and social outsider, recognized "how ambiguous is the freedom which emancipation has ensured, and how treacherous the promise of equality which assimilation has held out."³ Arendt viewed the noble qualities of "the Jewish heart"—humanity, humor, disinterested intelligence" as

1 Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) was a German-Jewish political theorist who was forced to leave Germany in 1933 and later immigrated to the United States. Her work focused on the political significance of individual human action, the role of thinking in ethical judgments, the modern loss of political authority, and the threat of totalitarianism. Her dissertation, *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation* (1929), was directed by Karl Jaspers and examined the concept of love in the writings of Augustine.

2 "We Refugees" (henceforth "WR"), 272.

3 "The Jew as Pariah" (henceforth "JP"), 276.

pariah qualities and the ignoble qualities of “tactlessness, political stupidity, inferiority complexes, and money-grubbing” as parvenu qualities.⁴ For Arendt, the pariah was a “human type” exemplified in Jewish poets, writers, and artists like Heinrich Heine, Bernard Lazare, Charlie Chaplin, and Franz Kafka, each of whom remonstrated, albeit in hidden ways, against a world that threatened their liberty and humanity.

Nonetheless, Arendt eventually realized that both the pariah and the parvenu had come to occupy the same social location and had been “branded with the same mark.”⁵ Whether Jewish refugees remained aloof from or assimilated into society, they remained branded as Jews. In 1944 it had become apparent that “there [was] no protection in heaven or on earth against bare murder, and a man [could] be driven at any moment from the streets and broad places once open to all.”⁶ According to Arendt, the only option left open, if suicide was deemed unacceptable, was to “live as a man among men,” which is to say, to live as a “conscious pariah,” a stranger living a simple and decent life in spite of the lack of individual freedom and the lack of basic human protections.⁷

In a similar way, Christians found themselves in the midst of an identity crisis in the wake of the fall of Rome when they stood accused of contributing to its demise and were trying to find their place in a world that had become inhospitable to them and their religion. Augustine offered these Christian pariahs a peculiar identity in his *De Civitate Dei contra Paganos* (hereafter *De Civitate Dei*). In this work, Augustine examines the identity crisis of another group of outsiders which he calls *civitas Dei peregrina*. Peter Brown has highlighted Augustine’s response to this identity crisis:

In the years after 410, the Christians who flocked into the great basilicas of Carthage were uncertain of themselves. They had boasted of the “Christian Era,” and now it had coincided with unparalleled disasters. After a generation of success, they found themselves unpopular Augustine told them just what a demoralized group needs to hear. He gave them a sense of identity; he told them where they belonged, to what they must be loyal He told them they were a distinct people: “citizens of Jerusalem.” “O God’s own people, O Body of Christ,

4 “WR,” 274.

5 “JP,” 296.

6 *Ibid.*, 296.

7 *Ibid.*, 297.

O high-born race of foreigners on earth [peregrinatio] . . . you do not belong here, you belong somewhere else."⁸

The identity that Augustine conferred upon the "demoralized" and "uncertain" Christians was: *peregrinus*. What did Augustine mean by this term? Although it is variously translated as "pilgrim" or "foreigner," an analysis of its history in Roman law and its roots in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures points to a more radical meaning and function that comes closer to Arendt's "conscious pariah," who traverses the boundary between emancipation and assimilation.

In the opening lines of *De Civitate Dei* Augustine describes the City of God as "dwell[ing] by faith, as a pilgrim among the ungodly" (cum inter impios peregrinatur ex fide vivens).⁹ The essence of *De Civitate Dei* can be said to be contained in these seven Latin words. Moreover, *peregrinus* is the pivotal term within these seven words: it denotes both the mode of "dwelling by faith" and the means of living "among the ungodly." This single term offers an insight into the relationship between the mode of being-in-the-world (metaphysics), and the means of being-with-others-in-the-world (ethics). Given that this term appears as a central theme in Augustine's work, it can serve as a key to his metaphysics and ethics. Indeed, as Brown has suggested, "if we can seize the nuances of this term [peregrinus] . . . we can gain an impression of an essential theme in his [Augustine's] religion."¹⁰ Given that for Augustine the content of faith implies morals, it follows that the way to his ethics is through his theology, where his metaphysics is manifestly operative. (CG 4.3) Augustine's *peregrinic metaphysics*, the mode of being-in-the world, is the foundation of his *peregrinic ethics*, the means of being-with-others-in-the-world.

Augustine's description of the City of God as *peregrinus* in *De Civitate Dei* is similar to Arendt's description of the Jewish refugee as a pariah. When Arendt's *pariah* and Augustine's *peregrinus* are compared, it becomes possible to understand *peregrinus* in a more radical way—as

8 *Augustine of Hippo* (henceforth *AH*), 313–14. See also Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms*, trans. Parker, 137.12, 168.

9 *City of God* (henceforth *CG*) 1.1, hereafter cited in text. Although Arendt's articles and *De Civitate Dei* may seem unrelated it is important to remember that Arendt's dissertation was on the concept of love in Augustine. Additionally, as Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark have pointed out, Arendt's dissertation is "centrally concerned with the tension between worldliness and disengagement" and consequently prefigures the pariah-parvenu theme that appears in her later works, such as *Rahel Varnhagen* and "The Jew as Pariah" ("New Beginnings," 127).

10 *AH*, 324.

a technical term indicating a metaphysics of contingency that serves as the basis for radical hospitality to the stranger.¹¹

II

The Latin term *peregrinus* occurs frequently in the work of St. Augustine. Although the term only occurs 15 times in the *Confessiones* its usage constitutes a key theme in that work. It occurs with increasing frequency in his homiletical and hermeneutical work such as the *Sermones* (134 occurrences) and *Enarrationes in Psalmos* (245 occurrences). By the time Augustine wrote *De Civitate Dei* in 426, *peregrinus* had become a central lexical element in his work and had begun to function as a technical term that indicated the metaphysical foundations of his theology and ethics.

Etymologically, the verb *peregrinari* denotes the spatio-temporal movement through, or over (*per*), a land, territory, or country (*ager*). It suggests a resistance to accommodation—a desire to just “pass through.” The nominal form, *peregrinus*, suggests an outsider who is on-the-move and therefore not committed to a city. The *peregrinus* is therefore one who does not belong—a foreigner, a stranger.

But the Roman usage of the term also conceals a pejorative core. Cicero, in his *De Officiis*, praised the nobility of Roman law and the Romans’ scrupulous observance of it even in war by noting that even public enemies (*perduellis*) were referred to as guests (*hostis*) in the Twelve Tables of Roman law. Cicero goes on to point out that *peregrinus* became a charitable designation in his day for an “enemy” who was treated as a “guest”:

This I also observe—that he who would have properly been called “a fighting enemy” [*perduellis*] was called a “guest” [*hostis*], thus relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for “enemy” [*hostis*] meant to our ancestors what we now call “stranger” [*peregrines*]. This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: “Or a day fixed for trial with a stranger” [*hostis*]. And again: “Right of ownership is inalienable forever in dealings with a stranger” [*hostis*]. What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at war is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given that word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of

11 The overwhelming frequency of this term in Augustine’s work would make a complete genealogy of it impossible. An examination of both the *Sermones* and *Enarrationes in Psalmos* would provide a fuller and richer understanding of this term but is beyond the scope of the present article, which will limit its investigation to the *Confessiones* and *De Civitate Dei*.

“stranger” and has taken on the technical connotation of an “enemy under arms.”¹²

With the codification of Roman law in the Twelve Tables, a more hospitable approach to enemies became necessary, and enemies were treated as “strangers” (*hostis*). Cicero’s discussion of the development of the term in Roman jurisprudence reveals that the Roman understanding of the term *peregrinus* emerged from an experience that sought to transform hostile enemies, who were worthy of suspicion, into guests. But, although *peregrinus* constitutes a mollification of the suspicion and perceived hostility of an enemy under Roman law, the “ugliness of the fact”—the strangeness of the stranger—remained latent in the term. *Peregrinus* was not applied simply to a harmless pilgrim wandering through town, nor merely to a guest who deserved equal treatment under the law, but retained its pariah implication that provoked quiet suspicion, even in the absence of open hostility. Augustine’s use of the term *peregrinus* should be understood against the background of this suggestion of the hidden enemy in the stranger.

III

The *Confessiones* can be understood as an account of Augustine’s journey toward God. The structure of the work follows a movement of estrangement and return, and the term *peregrinus* serves as a thematic marker for this structure. In book 2 Augustine uses the verbal form of *peregrinus* to describe his life in Madauros where he “first lived away from home” (*peregrinari*) at sixteen, and then a nominal form to describe his life in Carthage as “distant absence” (*longiniquioris . . . peregrinationis*).¹³ These examples show how the notion of displacement is central in Augustine’s understanding of *peregrinus*. Like Aeneas, the young Augustine is a long way from home, but eventually this exilic state becomes unbearable and he longs to return home. Julia Kristeva has noted the double focus of his understanding of *peregrinus* that involves “estrangement and reunion, want and desire—and never the one without the other.”¹⁴ This double focus creates a tension between captivity in a distant land and longing for home. The metaphysical dimensions of this tension can be seen in book 10, where Augustine describes himself as being a “traveler absent from [God]” (*quandiu peregrinor abs te*) and refers to 2 Corinthians 5:6, where the Apostle Paul describes life in this world as being “at home in the body

¹² Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.12, pp. 39–41.

¹³ *Confessiones* 2.3.5, hereafter cited in text.

¹⁴ *Strangers to Ourselves* (henceforth *SO*), 83.

[but] away from the Lord" (10.5.7).¹⁵ In the larger context of this passage Paul uses the imagery of the ancient Hebrews wandering in the desert where they dwelt in tents as a metaphor for life in this world, which he describes as an "earthly tent" (*terrestris domus*) where "we groan, longing to be clothed with our heavenly dwelling" (*habitationem nostram quae de caelo*).¹⁶ Similarly, Augustine describes life in this world as a "wandering [peregrinatio] in alien realms" and a "wandering pilgrimage [peregrinatione]" (12.11.13, 13.14.15). Thus, Augustine's understanding of *peregrinus* suggests a tension between estrangement and return and provides a clue to his peregrinic metaphysics.

IV

In *De Civitate Dei*, the City of God sojourns in this world as a stranger absent from God, and yet sighing for the home that will be its completion. Augustine describes the City of God as "a stranger [peregrinus] in this world while seeking its supernatural fatherland" (15.15). This description highlights the inner tension in the term *peregrinus*—being *in* the world but not *of* it. This characterization of Christian existence as "strange," or somehow out-of-order with the world, has deep roots in the Christian tradition. The author of *The Epistle to Diognetus*, written in the late second century, describes Christians in a manner similar to Augustine's, referring to them as sojourning strangers on earth:

They live in countries of their own, but simply as sojourners [xenoi]; they share the life of citizens, they endure the lot of foreigners; every foreign land is to them a fatherland, and every fatherland a foreign land. They marry like the rest of the world, they beget children, but they do not cast their offspring adrift. They have a common table, but not a common bed. They exist in the flesh but they do not live after the flesh. They spend their existence on earth but their citizenship is in heaven. They obey the established laws but in their own lives they surpass the laws. They love all men and are persecuted by all. They are unknown and yet they are condemned; they are put to death and yet they give proof of new life. They are poor and yet make many rich: they lack everything and yet in everything they abound. They are dishonored, and their dishonor becomes their glory; they are reviled and yet they are vindicated. They are abused, and they bless; they are insulted and repay insult with honour. They do good and are punished as evil doers; and in

¹⁵ All English biblical quotations from *The New Oxford Annotated Bible*.

¹⁶ 2 Cor. 5:1–2, Vulgate.

their punishment they rejoice as finding new life therein. The Jews war against them as aliens [allophyloi]; the Greeks persecute them; and yet they that hate them can state no ground for their enmity. (5.5–17)

The early Christians were understood by this author to be living peregrinic lives, being *in* the world but not *of* it. They were apparently citizens of earthly communities, but also citizens of heaven. Their dual citizenship is rooted in a peregrinic metaphysics that Augustine develops in *De Civitate Dei*.

In *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine distinguishes between the *peregrinus* and the *civis* in order to draw attention to the difference between the City of God and the earthly city. The former have their citizenship above and are only sojourning in the world, but the latter have already arrived at their home, in the world, and have their citizenship below. In his description of the origins of the two cities, Augustine describes them as analogous to the first two offspring of Adam, in order to make a clear distinction between the *civis* and the *peregrinus*. He writes:

When those two cities began to run their course of birth and death, the first to be born was a citizen of this world [*civis huius saeculi*], and the second was a pilgrim [*peregrinus*] in this world, belonging to the City of God . . . Cain founded a city, whereas Abel, a pilgrim [*peregrinus*], did not. (15.1)

Expanding on this analogy, Augustine links the two cities with the actual cities of Jerusalem and Babylon in his exposition of Psalm 65, and describes Cain as the founder of Babylon, and Abel as the founder of Jerusalem.¹⁷ While this description may seem to contradict his statement in *De Civitate Dei* that Abel did not found a city, for Augustine Jerusalem is actually a heavenly city under gradual formation in the world that “produces citizens here below, in whose persons it is a pilgrim [*peregrinus*] until the time of its kingdom shall come” (15.1). Babylon, on the other hand, is a worldly city rooted in the earth. Its citizens are not peregrini but simply *cives*. Ironically, Cain founds a city, but is condemned to wandering,¹⁸ and Abel is a wanderer who founds a heavenly city.

This characterization allows Augustine to make an important metaphysical distinction between the two cities by way of his distinction between the two types of love, *cupiditas* and *caritas* (14.7). He states: “Two loves make up these two cities: love of God maketh Jerusalem,

¹⁷ *Saint Augustine's Exposition on the Psalms*, trans. Schaff (henceforth *SAEP*), Psalm 65.2, 268.

¹⁸ See Gen. 4:12.

love of the world maketh Babylon.”¹⁹ The two cities are directed toward opposing metaphysical ends, and therefore constitute two metaphysical orders: one “according to the flesh” and the other “according to the spirit” (14.1). The first metaphysical order is governed by a “perverted will” that constitutes an “evil love,” which is pride manifesting itself as a “self love”; the citizen of this order strives beyond his limits and “takes delight in his own self-sufficiency [and] falls away from the One who truly suffices him” (14.7, 14.13). The second metaphysical order is governed by a “righteous will” that constitutes a “good love,” which is a humility that “makes the mind subject to what is superior to it”; the citizen of this order has “love of God and love of neighbor as himself” (14.6, 14.7). However, this distinction is hidden because the two cities are “entangled and mingled” with each other (1.35).

For Augustine there is a metaphysical distance between God and his creation. As he points out in *De Civitate Dei*, God’s nature alone is simple and immutable, because “it has not anything that it can lose, and because it is not something different from what it has” (11.10). However, the nature of creation is not simple or immutable. Creation has received what it has from the Creator and consequently possesses being by participation in the Being of the Creator.²⁰ It is not identical with what it has received, and therefore is not yet complete. Created being is contingent being, since it is dependent upon the simple and immutable Being of God for its completion. Thus, citizens of the City of God, as peregrini, have two metaphysical moments: being and completion.²¹ On the one hand they are in the world (being); but on the other hand, they await their true home in heaven (completion).

But Augustine’s description of the peregrinic life is not of a world-denying pilgrimage. On the contrary, Augustine refers to this life as learning “ad aeternam” (for the sake of eternity).²² Those wandering from their heavenly home “make use of earthly goods like pilgrims [peregrini] without grasping after them, and are proved and corrected by evils” (1.29). For Augustine, the world is the greatest “of all visible things,” which are created as a result of God’s gratuity; God is the greatest “of all invisible things,” and he alone is the simple and immutable Good by

19 SAEP, Psalm 65.2, 268.

20 See for example Augustine’s description of the soul’s completion in heaven through “participation in an immutable Wisdom that is not itself,” CG 11.10.

21 Walz, “Augustine’s *The City of God*.”

22 *De Civitate Dei* 1.29, my translation. Cf. CG 1.29. Dyson translates this phrase as “school of eternity”; but Augustine uses the preposition *ad* before the accusative form of *aeternus*, which seems to indicate “towards” or “for the sake of” *aeternus* and not simply a possession of it.

which all other goods were created (11.4, 11.10). Creation is therefore an act of hospitality by God.

Augustine sees God's act of hospitality extending into the relationships between human beings. In book 14, he claims that "no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil, is evil because of some fault" (14.6). This claim allows Augustine to draw a sharp distinction between the sinner and the sin, the doer and the deed. The sinful deed is to be hated with a "perfect hate," but the sinful person is to be loved (14.6). It is precisely this peregrinic love that serves as an act of hospitality, and effects a healing and a transformation. The hated is transformed into the loved. As Augustine writes, "when the fault has been healed there will remain only what he ought to love, and nothing that he ought to hate" (14.6). This transformation is accomplished by a transformation of cupiditas into caritas, in which the world, along with everyone and everything in it, ceases to be an end enjoyed for its own sake, and becomes a sacrament used for the enjoyment of God. For Augustine, cupiditas is "a motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of one's self, one's neighbor, or any corporeal thing for the sake of something other than God."²³ Caritas, on the hand, is "a motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbor for the sake of God."²⁴

It should now be clear why Augustine chooses the term *peregrinus* for the City of God. It functions as a technical term indicating his metaphysics of contingency. To be a *peregrinus* is to traverse the boundary between time and eternity, and to live as a stranger in a world that is not one's home. And to be *in* the world, but not *of* it, is to be a pariah. It is to live at a distance from the world that is not one's home; or to put it in metaphysical terms: to have incomplete being that seeks its completion in the Source of being. As Matthew Walz has put it, "to be created means to be possessed of an interior space that can be filled. It means to be a being that needs something else besides itself to achieve its completion."²⁵ To be created is to be incomplete, and it is precisely this incompleteness that inaugurates the search for completion. In Augustine's well-known phrase from the *Confessiones*, "our heart is restless, until it rests in [God]" (1.1). It is this movement from lack to fullness, incompleteness to completeness, restlessness to rest, that constitutes Augustine's metaphysics. It is a metaphysics of being-on-the-way. This is peregrinic metaphysics.

²³ *On Christian Doctrine* 3.10.16.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ "Augustine's *The City of God.*"

V

Augustine's peregrinic metaphysics is the theological foundation for his ethics. The content of faith implies morals in Augustine. One learns to love rightly through right worship, and rightly directed love leads to good morals (4.4). In book 19 of *De Civitate Dei* he argues for a universalism that "preserves" and "follows" difference instead of eradicating it (19.18). He writes:

Therefore, for as long as this Heavenly City is a pilgrim [peregrina] on earth, she summons citizens of all nations and every tongue, and brings together a society of pilgrims in which no attention is paid to any differences in customs, laws, and institutions by which earthly peace is achieved or maintained. She does not rescind or destroy these things, however. For whatever differences there are among the various nations, these all tend towards the same end of earthly peace. Thus, she preserves and follows them, provided only that they do not impede the religion by which we are taught that the one supreme and true God is to be worshiped. (19.17)

Kristeva has connected this radical hospitality in Augustine to his experience as a peregrinus who "found, in Christianity's *civitas peregrina*, both a psychic momentum and a community of mutual assistance that seemed like the only solution to his uprooting, with neither rejection nor national assimilation."²⁶ The acceptance of difference among others is motivated by an awareness of difference within oneself. The awareness of one's incomplete being seeking completion in a Source that is radically other than oneself makes one vulnerable to the alterity of others. Moreover, a community of pariahs who are strangers in the world find a unity in difference, a collective identity: a *civitas Dei peregrina*. Peregrinic metaphysics is therefore the ground of peregrinic ethics. This connection is rooted in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures.

The ancient Hebrews understood themselves as aliens, strangers, or pariahs in the world. Indeed, in God's covenant with Abraham he says, "Know this for certain, that your offspring shall be aliens [gerim] in a land that is not theirs, and shall be slaves there, and they shall be oppressed for four hundred years."²⁷ It is precisely this understanding of themselves as pariahs that God appeals to in order to justify their hospitality to strangers. In Exodus 23:9 God commands the Israelites, "You shall not oppress the resident alien [ger]; you know the heart of an alien [ger], for you were

²⁶ SO, 84.

²⁷ Gen. 15:13.

aliens [gerim] in the land of Egypt.” In the *Vetus Latina* translations, and later in Jerome’s Vulgate translation as well, the Hebrew word “alien” (ger) is rendered as *peregrinus*. Augustine then connects the Christian’s life in this world and the experience of the ancient Hebrews who lived as “aliens in a land that [was] not theirs” through this term. Although Brown argues that Augustine’s use of *peregrinus* is tied to the experience of the Hebrew people as captives in Babylon, this use of the term demonstrates that its roots actually go deeper in the biblical tradition.²⁸ In fact, as Norman K. Gottwald states, “the oldest collection of laws in the Hebrew Bible is found in the Covenant Code of Exodus 20:24–23:19.”²⁹ Thus, the genealogy of the term *peregrinus* reaches the deepest roots of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The prohibitive command of Exodus 23:9 finds its prescriptive exemplar in the hospitality that Abraham shows to the three angels at Mamre in Genesis 18:1–15, to which the writer of Hebrews refers when he admonishes Christians to “not neglect to show hospitality to strangers [philoxenias] for by doing that some [Abraham] have entertained angels without knowing it.”³⁰ The Greek word translated “stranger” is *xenos* and can mean “foreigner” or “guest.” Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich have noted the inner tension in this Greek word and point to “hospitality” as the means of overcoming the tension. They write:

Strangeness produces mutual tension between natives and foreigners, but hospitality overcomes the tension and makes of the alien a friend. Historically foreigners are primarily enemies or outlaws who should be killed. It is then found however, that hospitality is a better way to deal with strangers, and they become the wards of law and religion.³¹

Hospitality is a type of overcoming. It is the ethical response to aliens that transforms them from enemies to guests, and from hated to loved. Indeed, in the Vulgate of Hebrews 13:2 the word for stranger is subsumed by the word for hospitality (*hospitalitatem nolite oblivisci per hanc enim latuerunt quidam angelis hospitio receptis*) so that hospitality can be seen as a transformative act that converts strangers into guests, and enemies into objects of love. This transformation is the result of peregrinic ethics.

²⁸ *AH*, 313–15.

²⁹ *The Tribes of Yahweh*, 58.

³⁰ Heb. 13:2.

³¹ *Theological Dictionary*, 662.

VI

Arendt's conscious pariah, like Augustine's peregrinus, lives as a stranger in this world that is often hostile. Both the pariah and peregrinus traverse the boundary between emancipation and assimilation. Each lives *in* the world, but is not *of* it. But it is precisely the consciousness of their pariahhood or peregrinic status that grounds their ethical orientation. Pariahhood grounds the noble qualities of " 'the Jewish heart'—humanity, humor, disinterested intelligence";³² and the self-identification of the peregrinus grounds Christian hospitality and charity. It is also worth noting that just as, according to Arendt, the tradition of the conscious pariah in Judaism was hidden and often eclipsed by the tradition of the parvenu, the tradition of the peregrinus in Christianity is also frequently hidden and perhaps often eclipsed by a parvenu Christianity that assimilates too quickly to the world, losing sight of its true home and consequently its moral vision. Only a community of conscious pariahs is capable of the radical hospitality that transforms enemies into guests; only a peregrinic metaphysics can ground peregrinic ethics.

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32 "WR," 274.

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